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Abstract: In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent￿ s
expectation about relevant events, e.g. about other agents￿behavior. Recent ex-
perimental studies as well as surveys have asked participants to state their beliefs
explicitly, but little is known about the causal relation between beliefs and other
behavioral variables. This paper discusses the possibility of creating exogenous in-
strumental variables for belief statements, by shifting the probabilities of the rele-
vant events. We conduct trust game experiments where the amount sent back by
the second player (trustee) is exogenously varied by a random process, in a way that
informs only the ￿rst player (trustor) about the realized variation. The procedure
allows detecting causal links from beliefs to actions under plausible assumptions.
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between beliefs and actions that is suggested by OLS analyses.
Keywords: Social capital, trust game, instrumental variables, belief elicitation
JEL Classi￿cation: C72, C81, C91, D84
1We thank participants of the CEMMAP/ELSE workshop on distorted beliefs as well as seminar audiences at
Autonoma, DIW Berlin, Exeter, Jena and Paris I for their comments. We are grateful for the ￿nancial support of
the U.K. Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC-RES-1973) and the ELSE centre at UCL. The experimental
sessions were conducted with the excellent support of Rong Fu, Tom Rutter, Brian Wallace and Mark Wilson.
Contact: m.costagomes@abdn.ac.uk, s.huck@ucl.ac.uk, g.weizsacker@lse.ac.uk1 Introduction
In subjective expected utillity theory and related models, the agent￿ s expectations can be viewed as
a pure as if construct, meaning that the expectations are no more than an elegant, low-dimensional
way of summarizing choice data. According to this view of expectations, choice is represented by
a hypothetical optimization problem that involves maximizing a function of expectations ￿ for
example, the expected utility function. But choice is the fundamental concept, and any additional
assumption that one may make about expectations is really an assumption about what choices are
made. A much more literal interpretation of expectations is that they are real, meaning that they
are independent entities that have some physical incarnation and that can in principle be accessed
directly, for example, by asking people to state them. Much can be said in favour of such an
interpretation, for instance that humans are able to express expectations even about variables that
are irrelevant for their choices. But if expectations are independent entities, one should be able
to in￿ uence them and thereby measure their e⁄ect on choices. This leads to the straightforward
empirical question we shall address in this study: are choices driven by beliefs?
This question has important consequences for policy interventions because its answer determines
whether one can induce e¢ cient outcomes by way of changing people￿ s expectations, as attempted in
many policy campaigns. Especially interventions that are geared towards creating trust or optimism
have this rationale, relying on the self-ful￿lling powers of such sentiments: if the policymaker can
induce the agents to be optimistic and trusting about future outcomes, their subsequent choices
may, collectively, justify the optimism and repay the earlier trust. By instigating an initial increase
in trust and optimism, the policymakers may therefore create a shift from a less desirable outcome
to a better one.
But the role of beliefs ￿rst needs to be a¢ rmed. Researchers have turned to belief elicitation
procedures where the agents state their expectations explicitly. Especially trust game experiments
(following Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995) provide a frequent context for such methods. Fehr
et al. (2003), Bellemare and Kr￿ger (2007), Sapienza, Toldra and Zingales (2007) and Naef and
1Schupp (2009), among others, ask the participants in their experiments to state expectations on
how much money other players will return if trusted, and ￿nd a strong correlation, as well as
much explanatory power, when regressing the level of trusting behavior on stated expectations.
We note that the trust game lends itself well to investigations of the role of beliefs, because there
is substantial behavioral variance both in the level of trust and in the stated expectations. Yet
it remains unanswered whether the variance in trusting behavior arises because of the variance in
stated beliefs, or whether the co-variation in the two variables is driven by other, omitted variables
that capture unobservable di⁄erences between the participants.
Under the latter hypothesis, one natural candidate for an omitted variable is the perception of
social norms. Take a simple two-player trust game experiment: the trustor invests in a joint venture,
and the trustee can either appropriate the investment and its return, or repay the ￿rst player￿ s trust
by sending some money back. Among the experimental participants who are assigned the role of
trustors, presumably some view a high investment as the ￿right￿thing to do, since this is the choice
that maximizes the social surplus and thus opens up the possibility of e¢ cient, mutually bene￿cial
exchange. Whether or not such social norms in￿ uence the investment choices may depend on
multiple factors that are unobservable, e.g. the participants￿education, cultural factors, or indeed
the framing employed in the experiment. But such unobservables will in￿ uence actions and beliefs.
In particular, it may be that the same participant who invests a large amount also predicts that
the other particpant will return a large amount because that, too, is arguably the ￿right￿thing to
do. That is, the unobservable perception of whether or not a social norm of mutual cooperation
is relevant can generate a correlation between the belief statement about the opponent￿ s behavior
and the player￿ s own investment choice ￿ without implying anything about a causal in￿ uence of
one variable on the other.
Such a correlation is not necessarily an artefact of some norm-sensitive behavioral rule but it
can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon in a quite natural game of incomplete information. We
develop a simple example to illustrate this in the appendix of this paper. Players interact in a mini
trust game with just two actions for each player, trust or not, and reciprocate or not. Both players
know that there is social norm that prescribes trust and its reciprocation, while self-interested
2behavior would induce the opposite, ine¢ cient outcome. There prevails some uncertainty about
whether self-interested choices will be sanctioned ￿ for example by the experimenter who may not
stick to his promise to treat observations anonymously. Players receive signals about the likelihood
of sanctions, e.g. from clues in the instructions or the experimenter￿ s general demeanor. As both
players read the same instructions and observe the same experimenter, these signals are correlated.
It is shown that even with relatively little correlation between the players￿expectations about norm
enforcement, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium predicts a strong correlation between the trustor￿ s own
actions and her belief about the opponent￿ s action. Both variables are driven by an underlying
ommitted variable, which is the trustor￿ s perception of the likelihood of norm enforcement. Our
example also shows that despite the strong correlation between beliefs and actions, an exogenous
shift of the trustor￿ s beliefs about the opponent￿ s action would have a relatively small e⁄ect on his
action. In other words, in the example it would be misleading to interpret the strong correlation
between beliefs and actions as saying that one drives the other, as both are indeed driven by the
possibility of sanctions.
This example evidently only suggests one kind of potentially relevant omitted variable. Multiple
omitted variables may be e⁄ective apart from social norms, and social norms may not even be the
most relevant one. Our intended insight is merely that the participants playing the game may well
have good reasons (here, play an equilibrium strategy in a more general game) to exhibit strong
correlations between beliefs and actions that the researcher may easily mis-interpret as a causal
relation. To measure the e⁄ect of a belief change on actions, one needs more powerful observations
than the simple correlations.
In Section 2 we introduce a technique to measure the e⁄ect, presented in two separate exper-
imental design variations. Both variations involve the arti￿cial creation of instrumental variables
in trust game experiments. These variables can be varied in a purely exogenous way, and thereby
are suitable instruments for the endogenous belief statements.
The ￿rst instrument applies to continuous-choice situations, like Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe￿ s
(1995) trust game. It is a random ￿shift￿that exogenously increases or reduces the trustee￿ s level
of re-payment. The realization of the random shift is known to the trustor, who as a result might
3change her belief statement about the trustee￿ s ￿nal level of re-payment, and might accordingly
change her own action. The trustee is informed of the existence of the shift and of its distribution.
However, she is not informed about the realization of the shift, and her behavior remains una⁄ected
by the realization. Therefore, the trustor￿ s belief about the trustee￿ s behavior (her chosen level of
re-payment prior to its manipulation through the shift) should also be una⁄ected by the realization
of the shift. Our data conforms to these predictions. At the same time, the beliefs about the
payo⁄-relevant event ￿the level of re-payment including the shift ￿react strongly to the exogenous
variation, which is necessary to apply IV estimation. Regarding the second, ￿exclusion restriction￿
requirement of IV, that the instrument in￿ uences the actions only via the beliefs about the level
of re-payment, we argue that it is natural to make this assumption because the instrument is an
element of the statistic that the belief is formed about, and does not enter the interaction in any
other way. The exogeneity of the shift also rules out that it is a⁄ected by any omitted variable and,
conversely, it plausibly does not a⁄ect potentially in￿ uential variables like personal characteristics
or perceptions of social norms.
The second instrument is an exogenously varied population of arti￿cial agents, ￿robots￿ , whose
actions replace a trustee￿ s action with some probability. This instrument is designed for use in the
context of discrete-choice situations like matrix games (but would in principle also be applicable
for continuous-choice problems) and we examine it in a separate experimental game. For both
instruments, we conduct a series of tests to investigate whether the overall distributions of belief
statements and actions changes signi￿cantly between treatments with and without the instrument.
For the continuous-choice version of the trust game, we ￿nd that none of the relevant statistics
are a⁄ected by the introduction of the instrument in any problematic way. For the discrete-choice
game, however, we ￿nd that some caution is in place as the belief statments indicate some subjects
might not have fully comprehended the procedure. We therefore put the main emphasis on the
analysis of the continuous-choice version of the game.
After the discussion of invasiveness and appropriateness of the instruments, Section 3 proceeds
with the analysis of the paper￿ s main question, whether a variation in beliefs drives choice behavior.
The analysis shows that the exogenous belief variation does indeed have a signi￿cant impact on
4choices, in both experiments. In the continuous-choice game, the IV-estimated e⁄ect of beliefs on
actions is not quite as strong as the naive OLS analysis suggests (which we carry out on a control
treatment without an instrument, producing similar results to the previous literature). But as in
OLS, the IV analysis ￿nds an e⁄ect that is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, and the point estimate
not too dissimilar from the OLS estimate (0.56 with IV versus 0.76 with OLS).2 In the discrete-
choice game, the IV estimate is much larger than the OLS estimate, with a point estimate of about
tripled size. A further check for the in￿ uence of omitted variables, we conduct analyses where we
include personal background variable that we collected in the laboratory ￿ demographic variables
as well as calculation skills and some attitudinal questions about trust. Including these controls
does not a⁄ect any of the results, indication that at least in the limited set of controls that we
have, there was no strong omitted variable that would arti￿cially drive the correlation of beliefs
and actions.
The ￿ndings constitute, to our knowledge, the ￿rst laboratory evidence that beliefs play a
causal role in the determination of actions. As such, the results con￿rm the important role of
beliefs not only in the trust game, but more generally in decisions under uncertainty. This role was
implicitly ascribed to beliefs in experiments that use stated expectations (McKelvey and Page, 1990,
O⁄erman, Sonnemans and Schram, 1996, Croson, 2000, Huck and Weizs￿cker, 2002, Nyarko and
Schotter, 2002, and many later studies) as well as survey evidence that solicits expectations about
relevant market variables (see Manski, 2004, and Attanasio, 2009, and the literature cited there).
An important set of close relatives to this paper are ￿eld experiments that vary informational
conditions in di⁄erent economic contexts, see e.g. Jensen (2008) and Dupas (2009). Under some
additional assumptions about how information maps into beliefs and actions, one can interpret
these studies as evidence for an e⁄ect of beliefs on actions. Our experiments complement this by
2A separate regression projects the participants￿actions directly on the exogenous shift variable. There, we also
￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect of the shift on the action, see Section 3. The procedure of replacing one player￿ s choice by an
exogenous random move has been done in several experimental studies that investigate whether positively reciprocal
actions appear only when a certain action is played by a human agent. See, in the context of the trust game, Cox
(2004) among others. These studies, however, replace the trustor￿ s action by a random move, whereas we manipulate
the trustee￿ s move.
5allowing for a consistent estimate of the size of the e⁄ect and by o⁄ering results in a clean laboratory
setting.
While the results are positive and provide supporting evidence to the previous supposition of
many economists that beliefs do in￿ uence actions, one needs to be aware that results may be
di⁄erent in di⁄erent settings, of course. As a general methodological point we therefore suggest
openly addressing the di¢ culty of ascribing di⁄erences in behaviors to observed di⁄erences in stated
expectations. Exogenous variation of arti￿cially introduced instuments may be a way to go in other
contexts as well, as the designer of experiments and surveys often have the freedom to create an
appropriate variation. This is further discussed in the conclusion of the paper, appearing in Section
4.
2 Experimental design: Instrumental variables for belief state-
ments
The experimental design revolves around two simultaneous-choice trust games involving two play-
ers. In one of them, both players have a continuum of possible actions (Continuous Trust Game,
henceforth CTG), while in the other players only have two actions each (Mini Trust Games, hence-
forth MTG). For each game, and in addition to the choice data, we collect trustors￿beliefs about the
actions played by the trustees. In separate treatments both games are played with and without an
instrumental variable that serves as a driver for the trustor￿ s beliefs about the level of repayment.
The games played without the instrument are control games that are needed for two reasons. First,
they allow for an important empirical check of the validity of each instrument: whether or not the
instrument a⁄ects behavior in undesirable ways. In ￿eld studies that involve IV methods, this is
less of a concern because the instrument is usually part of the natural decision making environment.
But with an arti￿cial instrument, we should check that the instrument is neutral in the sense that
its presence does not distort the data generating process. Second, and no less important, the control
treatments provide a data source for OLS estimates and similar methods that do not make use of
6the instrumenting technique and that serve as the comparison benchmark for our IV results.3
With two baseline games, CTG and MTG, and two conditions regarding instrument (I)/no
instrument (NI), we create four games altogether, CTG/I, CTG/NI, MTG/I and MTG/NI, as in
a 2x2 factorial design. In each experimental treatment each of the two baseline games is played
once; one of them under the intrument condition, the other one without it. Thus, in the ￿rst
part of each treatment we randomly and anonymously matched pairs of participants to play one
of the baseline games under one of the instrument conditions, and in the second part we rematch
the participants randomly and anonymously, and ask them to play the other baseline game under
the other instrument condition. For example, subjects who ￿rst play CTG/I would then switch to
MTG/NI. The participants receive no feedback between the two games. In the second match, we
also switch the player role assigned to each participant, so that a trustor in the ￿rst game becomes
a trustee in the second game and vice versa. Thereby, we can make sure not only that every
participant is in exactly one treatment that involves an instrument but also that she is a trustor
exactly once and is therefore asked to state exactly one belief about the opponent. Our balanced
design allows us to check whether order e⁄ects in￿ uence play of the games for each of the player
roles because each of the four games appears as the ￿rst game being played in one treatment, and
as the second game in another treatment.
For the collection of belief statments, we employ a quadratic scoring rule, which is incentive
compatible in the sense of theoretically eliciting the mean of the subjectively expected distribution,
under the assumption that subjects are risk neutral.4
3Again, this is di⁄erent from the ￿eld where both OLS and IV are normally run on the same data set. This would,
however, not yield the desired insights in our context. Under the hypothesis that an omitted variable is at work in
the trust game, an OLS analysis on the data with instrument does not identify the co-variation between the relevant
beliefs and actions, as the beliefs are arti￿cially perturbed. That is, in the treatment with instrument, the beliefs
are formed about a di⁄erent statistic, which is the return including the shift and is thus not the relevant statistic in
the trust game without the instrument. The belief distributions and the nature of the beliefs may therefore di⁄er
between the treatments. If the true data generating process involves an omitted variable, then the OLS results may
thus also di⁄er between the two treatments. The analyst￿ s interest arguably lies in the validity of OLS as a diagnostic
tool in the treatment without instrument.
4The quadratic scoring rule has been used by numerous researchers and ￿ although not all studies agree (see e.g.
7We conducted our experimental sessions at University College London and at the University
of York, with a roughly equal number of subects in each treatment at each location, as reported
in Table 1. The appendix contains a sample of the instructions. In all, 434 experimental subjects
participated in our sessions. Subjects earned points by playing two games and one belief elicitation
task, which were then converted into money at an exchange rate of 40 points per $1. They were
also paid a show-up fee of £5. Sessions lasted about 90 minutes from the moment they were seated
until leaving the laboratory after collecting their payments.
Treatment # York Participants # UCL Participants # Total Participants
CTG/I ￿MTG/NI 62 62 124
MTG/NI ￿CTG/I 62 58 120
CTG/NI ￿MTG/I 46 50 96
MTG/I ￿CTG/NI 48 46 94
Table 1: Overview of treatments
2.1 The Continuous Trust Game (CTG) and the shift instrument
Under the rules of the CTG, each of the two players initially receives an ￿account￿that contains
100 points. The trustor, here labelled ￿participant X￿ , chooses the share a1 of her points that are
to be transferred to the trustee, ￿participant Y￿ . The transfer is productive ￿ every point that
the the trustor sends is tripled on the way to the trustee. Simultaneously, i.e. without knowing
the trustor￿ s transfer, the trustee decides how much to transfer back from the total that she has
in her account after X￿ s transfer. Both transfers are chosen simultaneously, so the trustee, like the
Croson, 2000, and Rutstrom and Wilcox, 2009) ￿ it is usually not found to be intrusive in the sense of a⁄ecting the
players￿actions in the games (see e.g. Blanco et al, 2008, Costa-Gomes and Weizs￿cker, 2008). In our experiment,
the danger of such an intrusion appears minimal, given that we elicit beliefs after the choices. Either the participant
is done with his or her decisions at this point of the experiment, or he or she proceeds to be a trustee in the second
match ￿but the trustees￿choices are not the focus of our study. Moreover, any possible e⁄ect on trustees￿choices
cannot even enter the trustors￿expectations: the trustors in the second match were trustees in the ￿rst match and
were not made aware of the belief elicitation task that their opponents faced in the ￿rst match.
8trustor, makes a decision about a relative ￿transfer share￿a2, not an absolute amount.
The transfer shares (a1;a2) are restricted to lie in the interval [0:2;0:8]. Thus, e⁄ectively, the
trustor can transfer between 20 and 80 points, which are tripled and added to the trustee￿ s amount,
resulting in an account balance for the trustee between 160 and 340 points. Of these points, the
trustee can transfer back a share of between 0:2 and 0:8 but has to do so without knowledge of the
exact account balance that she has available. This simultaneous version of the trust game has the
advantage that the trustor￿ s beliefs about the trustee￿ s transfer share are a comparatively simple
object ￿ a distribution over [0:2;0:8]. (In the sequential version the trustor￿ s beliefs would specify
such a distribution for each possible action of his own.)
The instrumental variable is a shift z that increases or decreases the trustee￿ s transfer share by
a value between ￿0:2 and 0:2, which is randomly drawn from a uniform probability distribution
over the 41 values on the grid f￿0:2;￿0:19;:::;0;:::;0:19;0:2g. The participants are both informed
that the trustee￿ s transfer share a2 will be randomly changed by adding the random variable z to
it. The trustor is, in addition, informed about the value of z, while the trustee is not. For example,
suppose that upon being informed that the realization of the shift z is 0:15, the trustor transfers a
share a1 = 0:4 of her intitial balance of 100 points, thus leading to intermediate account balances
of 60 and 220 points for the trustor and trustee, respectively. In addition, suppose that the trustee
decides to transfer a2 = 0:3, which leads to an actual transfer to the trustor of 0:45 = 0:3+0:15 of
the trustee￿ s intermediate balance, leading to ￿nal balances of 159 and 121 points for the trustor
and trustee, respectively.
The experimental participants receive instructions about the instrument that begin with the
following sentences.
￿There is one important detail about the transfer out of Participant Y￿ s account. The
computer adjusts the share that is actually transferred from Participant Y￿ s account
to Participant X￿ s account. More speci￿cally, the computer will adjust Y￿ s transfer
share in a random way, increasing or reducing it by up to 20 percentage points. That
is, the computer will generate a number that we call ￿CHANGE TO Y￿ s TRANSFER







Figure 1: Illustration of the continuous trust game with instrument. Player 2 knows only the
distribution of z and chooses action a2. Player 1 knows the distribution of z and the value of z
before choosing action a1 and belief statement b1. f(a1) indicates that player 2￿ s account balance
depends on a1.
+19%, +20%. Each of the whole-numbered percentages in this range is equally likely.￿
The instructions continue by giving a repetitive illustration of the instrumental variable and its
e⁄ects on payo⁄s. The game￿ s rules, including the role of the instrument, are illustrated in Figure
1.
After making their choices, the trustor is asked to report her belief statement about the trustee￿ s
￿adjusted transfer share￿ , i.e. about the sum e a2 = a2+z. The belief statement is rewarded according
to the quadratic scoring rule
￿b = ACTG ￿ cCTG(e a2 ￿ b1)2,
where b1 is Participant X￿ s belief statement about Participant Y￿ s transfer share, and the parameter
values are ACTG = cCTG = 250 points. This elicitation procedure applies both when the game is
played with and without the instrument ￿ when played without the instrument, the trustor is
simply asked about the trustee￿ s transfer a2. At the time when participants choose the actions in
the game, none of them is made aware of the subsequent belief elicitation task.
10Importantly, the shift instrument z is generated independently of all other relevant random
variables. This property justi￿es the conditional exogeneity assumptions that are required for IV:
in the bi-variate linear projection of the trustor￿ s transfer share a1 on her stated beliefs b1,
a1 = ￿0 + ￿1b1 + u, (1)
the exclusion restriction requires that while the error term u can, in general, be confounded with b1
due to omitted variables, the instrumental variable needs to be orthogonal to u. (If other controls
are included, the analogous statement with the corresponding error term of the regression on beliefs
and controls is required.)5 Since z is independently generated in the laboratory, we can rule out
that u has an in￿ uence on z , or that any omitted variable may co-determine u and z. It remains an
assertion that z does not in￿ uence u. We regard this as a reasonable assertion because z is simply
a component of e a2, which is the statistic that beliefs b1 are formed about, and z does not enter the
interaction in any other way.6
This discussion also relates to the interpretation of the explanatory variable b1. For the IV
estimate of ￿1 to be consistent, we interpret the connection of b1 and a1 in (1) as a causal link
between stated beliefs b1 and actions a1, and assume that the exogenous information z does not enter
a1 other than through b1. The stated beliefs are thus interpreted as containing all choice-relevant
assessments of the re-payment rate on behalf of the agent. This requires a rather consistent pair of
responses from the experimental participants in the two tasks ￿ e.g. we rule out that they report
a random belief statement but are in￿ uenced by z in their actions. But we note that the monetary
incentives to report optimal belief statements is designed to minimize such random belief statments.
Section 3 will contain results that demonstrate that belief statements are indeed strongly responsive
to z (in fact, they respond in a way that is consistent with the hypothesis that participants simply
add z to their beliefs about a2), lending support to the validity of the instrument.
5See e.g. Angrist and Pischke (2009) for a useful wider discussion of exclusion restrictions.
6Of course, the functional form assumption is never innocuous but this is a general property of regression analyses.
We also note that if one is willing to maintain linearity assumptions, the exogeneity of z and u should hold true for
much wider classes of preferences than then money-maximizing-agent model. All preferences over distributions of
players￿earnings (e.g. inequity-averse preferences) that induce a linear model are compatible with the orthogonality
of z and u.
112.2 The Mini Trust Game (MTG) and the robot instrument
Under the rules of the MTG, the participants play the following matrix game.
Column
left right
Row top 120;120 120;120
bottom 270;210 30;360
Row acts as the trustor in this game, having the choice between the safe action top and the
uncertain action bottom, whereas Column simultaneously chooses between left and right. The
trusting (also the cooperative) outcome is the action pair (bottom;left) ￿ involving less inequality
than the outcomes following top, but maximizing the sum of earnings by a considerable margin.
Both players￿cooperative actions are socially desirable in that they increase the pie size.
After the game is played, Row￿ s belief about Column￿ s probability of choosing left is elicited,
again with a quadratic scoring rule: every participant in the role of Row is asked to report a
probability bl 2 [0;1] of the event that her Column opponent chooses left. From this task she
earns an additional payo⁄ of
￿b = AMTG ￿ cMTG(Il ￿ bl)2,
where Il is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if the participant￿ s opponent actually
chooses left, and the payo⁄ parameters are AMTG = cMTG = 300 points.
The instrumental variable is introduced to the participants as detailed in the following passage
from the experimental instructions.7
￿There is a twist in this decision scenario. The decision that the COLUMN participant
makes is not always COLUMN￿ s FINAL DECISION between left and right. In one
out of two cases, that is, with a probability of 50%, COLUMN￿ s DECISION is made
by a ROBOT. If this happens, then the robot that makes the choice will be selected
randomly by the computer from a pool of 10 pre-programmed robots.￿
7The quote is changed from the original instructions in the labelling of actions; we used the abstract symbols #
and & instead of the words left and right.
12The instructions continue by giving more detail on this random procedure. They explain that
there are ten pre-programmed robots, each of which chooses either left or right. The precise
distribution of the robots￿actions is unknown to the trustee who only knows that this distribution
is itself a random variable: all 11 possible distributions (all 10 choose left), (9 choose left, 1
chooses right), ..., (all 10 choose right) are equally likely. Only the trustor is informed about the
actual distribution of robots￿actions. We denote this distribution of the robots￿actions by zl, a
random variable that is, just like the instrument in the CTG, independent of all potential relevant
background variables in our statistical analysis. At the same time, the realization of zl may of
course be relevant for Row￿ s choice, to the extent that her choice is driven by the expectation
about Column￿ s ￿nal decision.8
A few comments about this instrumental variable are in order, as one may notice two potential
pitfalls. First, the instructions for this instrument are relatively complicated and involve a two-step
random procedure: Nature determines the robots￿pool composition (drawn uniformly among eleven
possible values) and also whether the robots are relevant for the ￿nal choice (with 50% chance).
This may lead to confusion among the participants. The problem can partially be overcome by
instructing the participants with much care, but the complexity could limit the possible use of this
instrument and create disturbances in the data. Section 3 will show that certain data patterns
show suspicious deviations from theoretical predictions. Second, the robot instrument potentially
distorts the trustees￿choices because they can realize that the robots will on average choose each
action with probability one half. This a⁄ects the players￿payo⁄s in a speci￿c direction and the
participants may therefore change their choice probabilities in response (for example, they may
want to counteract the behavior of the robots). For these reasons, the bulk of the data analysis in
the next section will focus on the CTG, where the above pitfalls do not apply.
8Theoretically, a Row participant who believes that a proportion bl of Column participants choose left and who
receives the information that a proportion zl of the robots choose left would update her assessment of Pr(opponent
chooses left) by adding the di⁄erence
1
2(bl + zl) ￿ bl =
1
2(zl ￿ bl) to her initial belief bl of Column. Thus for each
additional left playing robot that is added to the distribution of robots, the belief increase by ￿ve percentage points.
133 Results: Causal e⁄ects of beliefs
3.1 Preliminaries: Data pooling, descriptives, checks for invasiveness and ￿rst-
stage regressions
Data Pooling. We ￿rst determine if there are any statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences between the
data collected at UCL and at York, and between data that were generated in the participants￿￿rst
versus second matchings (recall that every participant played two versions of the trust game). We
do so for each of the games and consider both actions and stated beliefs. The absence of major
di⁄erences allows us to pool the data and simplify the subsequent analysis.
We start with the CTG data and compare the distributions of transfer shares of each of the
players and the distributions of the trustors￿stated beliefs. Initially, we pair the two treatments
in which the CTG game was played under the same instrument condition at each of the locations,
thereby testing for order e⁄ects. The absence of such order e⁄ects leads us to pool the data and
test for laboratory e⁄ects, by comparing the data collected at the two di⁄erent locations. We
apply Kolmogorov-Smirnov￿ s two-sample exact test to the transfer shares and belief statements
and ￿nd no statistically signi￿cant order or laboratory e⁄ects, for any of the player roles or for any
instrument condition.9
We follow the same steps for the MTG data. Here, we apply Fisher￿ s exact test to compare the
distributions of each of the players￿binary choices and again Kolmogorov-Smirnov￿ s two-sample
exact test for the distributions of the trustors￿stated beliefs. Once again, initially we test for order
e⁄ects by pairing the two treatments in which the MTG game was played with the same instrument
condition at each of the locations. No order e⁄ects appear, and we pool the data of the participants￿
two matchings and test for laboratory e⁄ects. We again ￿nd no statistically signi￿cant order or
laboratory e⁄ects, neither in the actions data nor in the beliefs data.10 Therefore, in the subsequent
9The twelve tests on the order and laboratory e⁄ects all produced p-values above 0.1, with the exception of the
test of order e⁄ects on the trustee￿ s transfer share in the instrument condition at for the sessions run at York, which
had a p-value of 0.003. Since our data analysis focusses entirely on the trustors, the rejection of the null nypothesis
for trustees at York is not problematic. Appendix C has more detail on this and other features of the data.
10The lowest p-value is 0:24. In addition, we use Exact Chi-square tests to test the hypothesis that the pooled
data was generated randomly. The hypothesis is rejected for both player roles in both instrument conditions with
14data analysis we use the pooled data played under each instrument condition.
Descriptives. Before turning to the question of whether the instrument was distortive in undesirable
ways, we ￿rst decscribe the marginal distributions of the data, for each of the four games. We focus
on the trustor￿ s data, as the trustee￿ s role in this study is only to generate an uncertain re-payment.
In the continuous-choice game without instrument, CTG/NI, the transfer shares of the trustor
follow a familiar tri-modal pattern that has been observed in many other trust game experiments,
with substantial proportions of participants transfering the lowest possible amount (here, a transfer
share of 0:2, chosen by 32:6%), or the midpoint of the action space (0:5 transfer share, chosen by
19:0%) or the highest possible transfer share (0:8, chosen by 14:7%). The remaining data are
dispersed between these three modes. The average transfer share in CTG/NI is 0:427 (std. dev.
0:218). The belief statements of the same participants have an average of 0:350 (std. dev. 0:132).
This is not too far from the target of the belief statement excercise, i.e. the trustee￿ s actual mean
transfer share, which is 0:306 (std. dev. 0:144).
The corresponding numbers for CTG/I with instrument are of comparable size, with the excep-
tion that the presence of the instrument induces additional variance in the belief statements ￿ as
it should because the shift is random. The frequencies of transfer share that lie on the points of the
simplest three-point grid f0:2;0:5;0:8g are 30:3%, 7:4% and 18:9%. The average transfer share is
0:435 (std. dev. 0:226). The belief statements in treatment CTG/I have an average of 0:330 (std.
dev. 0:185),11 which again makes for a fairly accurate mean prediction as the mean transfer share
of trustees lies at 0:303 (std. dev. 0:150).
the exception of the Row player in the instrument condition, as the split between top and bottom is fairly uniform in
these data.
11The larger variance of belief statements under CTG/I relative to CTG/NI is consistent with the fact that z adds
variance to the target of the belief statement. Under the assumption that the participants in CTG/I arrive at their
belief statements by simply adding the shift variable to their belief about a2, the two variables ￿belief about a2￿and
z are independent and one can thus simulate the predicted variance in CTG/I under the null hypothesis that beliefs
about a2 are constant between the treatments ￿ the variance of the stated belief in CRG/I is the sum of the variance
of z and the variance of the beliefs about a2 in CTG/NI. This is almost precisely con￿rmed in the data: empirically,
the sum of the variance of z and the variance of the stated beliefs in CTG/NI is 0:03292, the square root of which is
0:181, very close to the standard deviation of stated beliefs in CTG/I (0:185).
15In the discrete-choice game without instrument, MTG/NI, a proportion of 0:262 chooses the
trusting action bottom. The average belief statement about the trustee￿ s probability of left is
0:359 (std. dev. 0:320). This, too, is not far from the true value of the target: 31:2% of trustee￿ s
actually choose left. In the MTG with instrument, MTG/I, the trustor￿ s average belief statements
is signi￿cantly more optimistic, at 0:449 (std. dev. 0:293) but this change in belief is largely
justi￿ed by the robots￿bias towards playing left with ￿fty-￿fty. Empirically, the average behavior
of trustees in MTG/I is similar to MTG/NI, in that 26:3% of trustees choose left, but adding the
e⁄ect of the robots yields an average of ￿column￿ s ￿nal decision￿of 0:396.
Checks for invasiveness. We now examine whether the presence of an instrument has undesired
e⁄ects on how subjects play the games. There are two types of undesired invasiveness that one would
like to rule out. First, the mere introduction of the instrument should not a⁄ect the behavioral
variables, except through the channel of in￿ uencing the beliefs. In particular, in the CTG, where
the shift￿ s expectation is 0, it is natural to require that none of the averages of the behavioral
variables exhibit a signi￿cant variation between the treatments with and without the shift. The
NI/I comparisons made in the two previous paragraphs all pass this test, as the corresponding
hypothesis test for di⁄erences in means never registers a rejection at a signi￿cance level of 5%.
There is also no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the transfer shares￿variances.12
For the NI/I comparison in the MTG, matters are more complicated because the introduction
of the robots a⁄ect ￿column￿ s ￿nal decision￿on average, and hence should also a⁄ect the average
belief. What we would like is that the underlying beliefs about the opponent￿ s probability of playing
left (before the e⁄ect of the instrument) are equally distributed under both instrument conditions.
Although we cannot test this hypothesis directly (since we do not have access to the true underlying
beliefs) we can reconstruct what the underlying beliefs of a rational decision maker with the speci￿c
value of zl would have to be, given the observed belief statement.
An important check is whether these hypothetical, underlying beliefs are ￿admissible￿in the
12For the NI/I comparison of action data in CTG, we conducted for each player role a Mann-Whitney test as well
as a variance ratio test. For the comparison of belief statements in CTG, we conducted a Mann-Whitney test. None
of the tests rejected at any conventional level. For the comparison of variances in stated beliefs between CGT/NI
and CTG/I, see footnote 11.
16sense that they are in the unit interval. Other belief statements would indicate a potential confusion
on behalf of the participant. For example, with an instrument value of zl = 0:9 (i.e. nine out of
ten robots would choose left), it is ￿inadmissible￿to state the belief 0:3, as the underlying belief
about the opponent￿ s probability of choosing left would have to be a negative number. A similar
calculation can be made for treatment CTG/I, where it is required that b1￿z lies within the interval
[0:2;0:8], i.e. that the stated belief could have been derived from an ￿admissible￿underlying belief,
by simply adding the shift value. The results of these calculations indicate that under treatment
MTG/I, a substantial number of subjects may have been confused: 24% state ￿inadmissible￿
beliefs, given their instrument values. In contrast, under CTG/I, only 4% state ￿inadmissible￿
beliefs, leading us to conjecture that the instructions of CTG/I are easier to understand than those
of MTG/I. We therefore put the emphasis of our subsequent analysis on the CTG data. Also,
from here onwards, we exclude from the analysis all observations where a participant stated an
￿inadmissible￿belief.
First-stage regressions. A ￿nal preliminary check is whether the belief statements react to the
instrument, as is necessary for IV analyses. The answer is a clear yes, for both games. In the
CTG/I game, the slope coe¢ cient in a binary regression is estimated at 0:828 (robust std. dev.
0:131). The coe¢ ent is insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from 1, the theoretical value under the assumption
that the participants simply add the shift to their belief about the trustee￿ s action. Further support
for such a rational way of belief formation can be found by inspection of the location of (b1;z)-
pairs, in Figure 2. In the ￿gure, the dashed line represents the target, which is given by the mean
behavior of trustees plus the trustor￿ s speci￿c value of z. This line￿ s slope is equal to one, and
points on the line correspond to the set of optimal belief statements, conditional on the subjects￿
information. The solid line is the regression line generated from the depicted data. As can be seen,
a prominent feature of the data is that many (b1;z)-pairs lie on straight lines. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that the participants add their value of z to a belief that lies on the grid
f0:2;0:3;:::g. Altogether, 64% of the observations have this property, suggesting that the majority
of participants may have simply added z to their belief about a2.
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Figure 2: Stated beliefs versus shift in treatment CTG/I. Dashed line: average target + shifter.
Solid line: OLS predicted values, coe¢ cient 0:828 (p < 0:001, R2 = 0:31, # of obs.= 117)
18belief statements are "admissible" given the instrument values. Under the assumption that the
participants report, as would be optimal, the average of the probability of left for the robot and
their estimate of the human opponent￿ s probability of left, we would observe a regression coe¢ cient
of 0:5 (as indicated by the dashed line, representing the target after adding the robot proportion).
The empirical coe¢ cient is 0:570 (robust std. dev. 0:055), which is strongly di⁄erent from 0 and
insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from 0:5. Also, Figure 3 shows the analogous pattern as Figure 2, that the
large majority of points (93%) lie on a grid of straight lines. Here, however, this is less surprising
because the instrument is also distributed on a grid. In sum, the data analyses in this subsection
show that ￿ with the exception of the 24% of MTG participants who state "inadmissible" beliefs ￿
introducing the instruments has no undesirable side e⁄ects on the data distributions and generates
strong instrumental variables with the predicted e⁄ects on belief statements.
3.2 Regression analysis of the CTG data
Table 2 shows the results of the OLS analysis carried out on the CTG/NI data. (Remember, this
is the analysis that one would carry out in order to establish causality, in the absence of omitted-
variable problems.) The OLS estimates show a strong correlation of stated beliefs and the trustors￿
transfer shares. In the regression that does not include personal background characteristics, an
increase in the belief by 10 percentage points translates into an increase by 7:6 percentage points
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Figure 3: Stated beliefs versus robot proportion in treatment MTG/I. Dashed line: 1
2￿average target
+1
2 robot proportion. Solid line: OLS predicted values, coe¢ cient 0:570 (p < 0:001, R2 = 0:58, #
of obs.= 72)
20to a 9:5 percentage points increase in the transfer share.
Transfer share, Treatment CTG/NI
(1) (2)
OLS OLS
Belief statement 0.764 (0.186) 0.949 (0.207)
Constant 0.159 (0.065) 0.495 (0.292)
Personal controls no yes
# of Obs. 95 91
R2 0.214 0.431
Table 3: Transfer shares in treatment CTG/NI. Note: Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
A ￿naive￿attribution of these statistical connections to a causal e⁄ect would thus suggest that
beliefs are a strong driver of trust. The paper￿ s main question is whether this attribution can be
corroborated by the IV results. Table 4 has the IV results, showing that the answer is a¢ rmative:
Transfer share, Treatment CTG/I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
Belief statement 0.492 (0.099) 0.537 (0.133) 0.559 (0.195) 0.544 (0.268)
Constant 0.277 (0.036) 0.431 (.238) 0.255 (0.065) 0.428 (0.262)
Personal controls no yes no yes
# of Obs. 117 113 117 113
R2 0.149 0.279 0.146 0.279
Table 4: Transfer shares in treatment CTG/I. Note: Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
As indicated in column (3) of Table 4, the IV coe¢ cient without control variables is estimated
at 0.559. This is insigni￿cantly smaller than the OLS coe¢ cient from treatment CTG/NI.13 The
13It is also insigni￿cantly larger than the OLS coe¢ cient from the data with instrument, but this in itself is not an
21important observation about the IV results is that the coe¢ cient is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
To our knowledge this is the ￿rst evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the correlation between
beliefs and actions in an experimental game is indeed causal.
The results also show that within treatment CTG/I, there is no discernible di⁄erence in the
results of OLS versus IV.14 This is another indication that there cannot be a strong omitted-variable
problem. However, one may worry about the observation that the OLS coe¢ cients di⁄er between
CTG/NI and CTG/I. The di⁄erence is insigni￿cant, however, in a regression that includes all main
and interaction e⁄ects of treatment (NI/I) and belief statement.15 A further indication that omitted
variables play no large role is that the regressions with personal control variables yield essentially
unchanged results. The beliefs statement coe¢ cients in the odd-numbered columns of the tables
do not appear to simply re￿ ect the in￿ uence of the available background characteristics.
As a separate regression analysis, we also report the direct e⁄ect of the instrument on the
trustor￿ s transfer share. The results con￿rm directly that the exogenous variation has a signi￿cant
e⁄ect on the trustor￿ s transfer share. The impact of an increase in the shift is comparable to the
change associated with a corresponding increase in the stated belief in treatment CTG/NI (0:46
versus 0:56, in regressions without controls). However, the coe¢ cient here does not indicate a
measure for the size of the e⁄ect of beliefs on actions, merely the size of the e⁄ect of the arti￿cial
interesting observation because the belief statements in the treatment with instrument have been a⁄ected, as they
should, by the introduction of the instrument. (Cf. footnote 3.)
14Hausmann tests do not reject OLS assumptions at any conventional level.
15The signi￿cance level of a di⁄erence in slope coe¢ cients between the two treatments is p = 0:199. To the
extent that there is a di⁄erence between the two treatments, this could be generated by reciprocity: under treatment
CTG/NI, trustors may want to be kind to their opponents if they expect them to be kind as well. In treatment
CTG/I, part of the belief is driven by the computer draw, so a reciprocal agent may respond less to this belief.
22instrument on actions.
Transfer share, Treatment CTG/I
(1) (2)
OLS OLS
Shift 0.462 (0.174) 0.397 (0.204)
Constant 0.446 (0.021) 0.646 (0.250)
Personal controls no yes
# of Obs. 117 113
R2 0.059 0.187
Table 5: Transfer shares in treatment CTG/I. Note: Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
233.3 Regression analysis of the MTG data
Table 6 reports the essential regressions for the MTG data. The regressions are conducted without
control variables, and only on observations with "admissible" belief statements.
Pr(bottom)
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment MTG/NI MTG/I MTG/I
OLS OLS IV
Belief statement 0.383 (0.121) - 1.123 (0.296)
1
2￿(robot proportion) - 1.280 (0.314) -
Constant 0.125 (0.058) 0.192 (.101) 0.038 (0.145)
Controls no no no
# of Obs. 122 72 72
R2 0.077 0.193 0.072
Table 6: Trustor￿ s probability of bottom in treatments MTG/NI and MTG/I
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variable "1
2 ￿ (robot proportion)" is scaled
for comparability with belief statement.
The regressions con￿rm a signi￿cant causal role for beliefs in the determination of actions.
The variable "1
2￿(robot proportion)" is scaled to cover the interval [0; 1
2], in order to increase the
comparability of coe¢ cients across the table￿ s column￿ s: given the construction of the instrument,
an increase of of "1
2￿(robot proportion)" by one unit would theoretically translate into an increase
of the belief by one unit (cf. footnote 8).
We see from the regressions that the regressor coe¢ cients in the data from MTG/I are much
larger than for MTG/NI. This may be due to the select sample of respondents who make "admis-
sible" belief statements, or to the fact that the robot intervention is not neutral on the actions, as
described in the previous subsection as well as in Appendix C. These competing explanations can-
not easily be separated, and we thus regard the evidence from the MTG as less de￿nitive than that
from the GTG. But the fact that both the IV coe¢ cient of the belief statement and the coe¢ cient
of "1
2￿(robot proportion)" are signi￿cantly positive is nevertheless an independent con￿rmation of
24the causal role of beliefs.
4 Conclusion
Our intended contribution to the experimental literature is to introduce specially designed instru-
mental variables into the laboratory. In previous experiments, researchers have of course used
their control of the design to manipulate directly the explanatory variables of interest. This allows
causal insights and is of the main reason why experiments are so popular. But in some contexts,
the explanatory variable of interest is by its very nature an endogenous variable, and thus cannot
be fully controlled by the experimenter. In particular, the agents￿expectations about other agents
have this property. In such contexts, we point out that one can at least in￿ uence the explanatory
variable of interest to some degree, by way of using instrumental variables. Under standard linearity
assumptions, this su¢ ces to measure causal links. Similar procedures may be applied in studies
where the explanatory variable of interest is of a di⁄erent nature, but is likewise endogenous to the
process that determines the actions. Variables in this set may be responses to attitudinal questions,
happiness reports or even neurological data.
An unusual feature of our study is that we are explicitly asking about causal link of expecta-
tions on actions ￿ yet traditionally expectations are, at least under subjective expected utility, not
viewed as a concept that is separate from actions. We acknowledge that we do not o⁄er an alter-
native de￿nition of expectations, but simply take the belief statements as our data. We hope that
future research will allow us to give a more satisfying conceptual treatment of belief statements.
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275 Appendix A: An example of naive inference under omitted vari-
ables and equilibrium play
In this section we give an example of how the correlation between belief statments and actions
can be misleading in the presence of ommitted variables. To arrive at a ￿misleading￿e⁄ect, we
imagine that a researcher observes the full data (choices and belief statements about the opponent￿ s
choices) but ignores the possibility of a social norm, or any other unobserved variable, that could
drive behavior and belief statements. The players, in contrast, are aware of the full model and play
the unique Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the game.
The example builds on a 2x2 mini trust game, where player 1 can either trust (a1 = 1) or not
(a1 = 0) and player 2 can reciprocate (a2 = 1) or not (a2 = 0). The players are aware of a social
norm that prescribes trust and reciprocation (a1 = a2 = 1). A random event speci￿es whether
violations of the social norm are sanctioned: in state ! = 1, violations are sanctioned, and we
assume that this state arises with probability 1
2. If ! = 1 occurs, player i is penalized by a term ￿i
if she does not comply with the norm. The punishment parameter ￿i is known to the player herself
but not to her opponent, who only knows the distribution of ￿i to be uniform over [0;1]. If ! = 0,
no punishment applies.
A possible justi￿cation for such a probabilistic social norm enforcement is that with probability
1
2 the interaction does not remain anonymous. For example, an outside observer (say, the exper-
imenter) may identify each player￿ s action and impose a punishment ￿i on non-cooperative play.
Or, the players meet afterwards and may be compelled to reveal their play in the game. In this
case, the punishment parameter ￿i would re￿ ect the extent of embarrassment. The payo⁄s (￿1;￿2)
in the two states are as follows.
! = 0 Player 2
a2 = 0 a2 = 1
Player 1 a1 = 0 0;0 0;0
a1 = 1 ￿1;2 1;1
! = 1 Player 2
a2 = 0 a2 = 1
Player 1 a1 = 0 ￿￿1;￿￿2 ￿￿1;0
a1 = 1 ￿1;2 ￿ ￿2 1;1
We assume that the two punishment terms ￿1 and ￿2 are i:i:d: uniformly distributed on the
interval [0;1]. The worst feasible punishment, ￿i = 1, makes the non-cooperative action ai = 0
28weakly dominated for player i, under state ! = 1. The smallest possible punishment for player 2,
￿2 = 0, makes player 2￿ s non-cooperative action be weakly dominant (independent of !). Player
1￿ s optimal action depends on !, too, but as usual in the trust game it also depends on her belief
about a2 ￿ for a large expected return, it pays o⁄ to trust.
While players do not know the true state ! for sure, they each receive a signal si that has
precision 2
3. That is, Pr(si = 1j! = 1) = Pr(si = 0j! = 0) = 2
3, for i = 1;2. Their information
about ! is therefore correlated: players know that it is more likely than not that the opponent
receives the same signal. The probability of the opponent having the same signal is 5
9 (and the
correlation coe¢ cient between the two players￿signals is 1
9).
In this Bayesian game, a player￿ s type is given by her signal si and her punishment payo⁄ ￿i.
We assume for simplicity that the punishments (￿1;￿2) are independent of the signals (s1;s2). It
is then straightforward to determine the players￿optimal choice probabilities: for any signal si and
any belief about the opponent￿ s strategy, we ￿rst ask what values of ￿i make it optimal for the
player to choose the cooperative action ai = 1. The answer yields a cuto⁄ value b ￿i(si), such that
for ￿i ￿ b ￿i(si), the player chooses ai = 1. Each player i employs two such cuto⁄s, one for each
signal realization, si 2 f0;1g. Player i also entertains a belief about the opponent￿ s cooperations:
Pr(aj = 1jsi) =
P
e sj2f0;1g Pr(sj = e sjjsi)(1￿Pr(￿j < b ￿j(e sj))). This belief determines player i￿ s two
cuto⁄s, and the BNE solution is then found by solving for a set of four cuto⁄s that form a ￿xed
point. In particular, denote the choice probabilities under the players￿equilibrium strategies by
r = Pr(a1 = 1js1 = 0) = 1 ￿ b ￿1(s1 = 0); s = Pr(a1 = 1js1 = 1) = 1 ￿ b ￿1(s1 = 1); t = Pr(a2 =
1js2 = 0) = 1 ￿ b ￿2(s2 = 0); and u = Pr(a2 = 1js2 = 1) = 1 ￿ b ￿2(s2 = 1). To ￿nd e.g. the cuto⁄
value b ￿1(s1 = 1) that makes player 1 indi⁄erent upon signal s1 = 1, we solve
E[￿1(a1 = 0js1 = 1;b ￿1(s1 = 1))] = E[￿1(a1 = 1js1 = 1;b ￿1(s1 = 1))]
2
3
(￿b ￿1(s1 = 1)) = Pr(a2 = 0js1 = 1) ￿ (￿1) + Pr(a2 = 0js1 = 1) ￿ 1













Formulating analogous expressions for r;t and u allows to solve for the unique equilibrium values
29fr = 0;s = 3
5;t = 1
5;u = 1
2g. We see that in equilibrium, both players react strongly to their
signals.16
Now consider a naive researcher who wants to infer the causal e⁄ect of player 1￿ s beliefs on
her actions. We de￿ne a naive researcher as one who is not aware aware that the information
structure determines the players￿beliefs and actions. Rather, to allow for the possible observation
of heterogeneity in belief statments, the researcher views the players￿beliefs as exogenous and does
not require that they are in equilibrium. The researcher collects player-1 data on actions and belief
statements about player-2 actions, which we assume are reported truthfully, generated by the full
model with social norms. The researcher will therefore observe two di⁄erent belief statements: ￿rst,
when player 1 receives the signal s1 = 1, she reports the belief that her opponent cooperates with
probability










Under this signal realization s1 = 1, we saw above that her actions are cooperative with probability
3
5. Second, when player 1 receives the signal s1 = 0 she reports that her opponent cooperates with
probability










and her actions under this signal realization are cooperative with probability 0. The data on player
1 that the researcher observes can therefore be summarized in the following table (where the cell
entries indicate the relative frequency of the four possible belief-action pairs):
Player 1 Belief statements
bs1 = 11
30 bs1 = 1
3




a1 = 1 3
10 0
As the naive researcher ignores the existence of the social norm, he will also wrongly assign
16The equilibrium is in (essentially) pure strategies, as a player with a given punishment parameter ￿i and a given
belief about the opponent￿ s play has a strict best response, except for the zero-probability event that her paramter
￿i makes her indi⁄erent.
30causal e⁄ects: we assume that he attributes any change in actions exclusively to changes in beliefs.
(We also assume that the researcher is not puzzled by the fact that not all actions are best responses
to stated beliefs. One could write down a simple error model of what the researcher has in mind,
but this would not add much beyond the verbal statement in the sentence before these parentheses.)
He therefore believes that if he could intervene and in￿ uence players￿beliefs, he would also in￿ uence
players￿actions as prescribed by the frequencies in the data matrix. In particular, let us suppose
that he thinks he could convince all members of the player-1 population who hold the belief of 1
3
(i.e. one half of the population) to increase their belief by 1
30. These player 1s would then hold the
same belief as the other half of the population. After such an intervention, the naive researcher
would expect the actions to change in accordance to the di⁄erence between the columns of the
above data matrix. He would thus expect the following data after the intervention:
Player 1 Belief statements
bs1 = 11
30 bs1 = 1
3
Actions a1 = 0 2
5 0
a1 = 1 3
5 0
But what would the actual e⁄ects be of such an intervention, given the true model? To ￿nd
the answer, the researcher could use a simple announcement (related to what is called the ￿robot
instrument￿in Section 3): he could address all player 1s whose belief statement is 1
3, explaining
to them that in one out of 20 times, their opponent would be replaced by a robot that always
cooperates.17 In the above equilibrium, and starting from the belief 1
3, a player with signal s1 = 0
would indeed arrive at a belief that the opponent cooperates with probability 11
30, as one can easily
check:
17To be precise, the announcement must be made after the researcher observes the player 1￿ s intended actions
and belief statements, but before the game is played. Importantly, for this example, the researcher must not inform
player 2 about this intervention, because she would otherwise change her equilibrium behavior. Here in the theoretical
example such trickery may be acceptable for the sake of exposition. In our experiments, both players are told about
the possibility of intervention, so that no deception is used.
31Pr(opponent cooperatesjs1 = 0) =
19
20














Under the true model, what would be the e⁄ect of the announcement on player 1￿ s cooperation
rate? What the naive researcher misses is that even under the above announcement, a player 1 with
signal s1 = 0 would still assign a low probability to the event that a non-cooperative action would
be penalized. She would therefore still ￿nd the non-cooperative action a1 = 0 relatively attractive
￿ the omitted variable thus reduces the bene￿cial e⁄ect of the belief shift. But importantly, if
the researcher makes the above announcement, then he does not need to know the mechanism that
determines beliefs and actions and would still measure the correct causal link between them.
To ￿nd the size of the e⁄ect, we consider the relevant cuto⁄b ￿1(s1 = 0), after the announcement.
The indi⁄erence condition is:
E[￿1(a1 = 0js1 = 0;b ￿1(s1 = 0))] = E[￿1(a1 = 1js1 = 0;b ￿1(s1 = 0))]
1
3
(￿b ￿1(s1 = 0)) =
19
20



















b ￿1(s1 = 0) =
4
5
Thus only a proportion of Pr(￿1 ￿ 4
5) = 1
5 of the players with s1 = 0 would cooperate and the new
data matrix after the announcement is
Player 1 Belief statements
bs1 = 11
30 bs1 = 1
3
Actions a1 = 0 3
5 0
a1 = 1 2
5 0
We conclude that by looking at the frequencies instead of measuring the e⁄ect, the naive re-
searcher would considerably overestimate the causal link between beliefs and actions. Under the
true model, only one ￿fth of the announcement￿ s recipients would change their actions.
326 Appendix B: Instructions of treatment CTG/I18
WELCOME!
PLEASE WAIT UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER TELLS YOU TO START!
You are about to participate in an experiment in decision making. Universities and research
foundations have provided the funds for this experiment.
In this experiment we will ask you to read instructions that explain the decision scenarios you
will be faced with. We will also ask you to answer questions that test your understanding of what
you read. Finally, you will be asked to make decisions that will allow you to earn money. Your
monetary earnings will be determined by your decisions and the decisions of other participants in
the experiment. All that you earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to you in private, in cash, after
today￿ s session.
It is important to us that you remain silent and do not look at other people￿ s work. If you
have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand, and an experimenter will
come to you. If you talk, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will forfeit your
earnings. Thank you.
The experiment consists of two parts, part I and part II. In each part you will anonymously
interact with another participant in the room. The participant with whom you will interact in
part I will be di⁄erent from the participant with whom you will interact in part II. These two
participants will be randomly chosen by the computer. Your identity and the identities of the other
participants will not be revealed during or after the experiment.
Neither you nor the other participants will learn anyone else￿ s decisions until the entire experi-
ment (i.e., parts I and II) is over.
In the instructions below all earnings are described in points. At the end of the experiment all
points will be converted into money. Each point is worth 2.5 pence. That is, 40 points are worth
£1 (equivalently, 100 points are worth £2.50).
This handout contains the instructions for part I. These are the same instructions that the
18The instructions of the other treatments are available upon request. We conducted at least two sessions of each
treatment at each of the two locations (UCL/York). Some of the treatments at York were conducted in parallel as
part of a large session. In these, the participants received di⁄erent instructions, unbeknownst to them.
33participant with whom you are matched in part I will receive.
PART I INSTRUCTIONS
In this part you will be interacting anonymously with another participant in this room. The
decision scenario thus involves two participants called ￿Participant X￿and ￿Participant Y￿ . We
will inform you whether you are ￿Participant X￿or ￿Participant Y￿at the end of the instructions
but before the interaction begins.
At the start of part I we will create an account for each of the participants in our experiment,
and deposit 100 points into each account. At the end of the experiment, all points in the accounts
will be converted into money at the exchange rate mentioned earlier. By interacting with the other
participant in part I￿ s decision scenario you can change the balance in your account, as follows.
First, Participant X decides how many points s/he wants to transfer from her/his account to
Participant Y￿ s account. The points transferred from Participant X￿ s account will be tripled by
the computer when deposited into Participant Y￿ s account (in other words, Participant Y receives
three times the amount that Participant X sends).
Second, Participant Y decides how many points, out of the points that are in her/his account,
s/he wants to transfer into Participant X￿ s account. The number of points transferred from Partic-
ipant Y￿ s account will be equal to the number of points deposited into Participant X￿ s account (in
other words they will not be tripled). This concludes the interaction, and both participants will
later exchange the points in their accounts for money.
Both participants will be asked to announce a transfer share (as a percentage) of points in their
account that they want to transfer to the other participant￿ s account, instead of deciding on the
number of points that they want to transfer. That is, Participant X will announce the share of
her initial balance of 100 points that s/he wants to transfer to Participant Y. Participant Y will
also announce the share of the number of points in her/his account that s/he wants to transfer to
Participant X. However, when making her/his decision, Participant Y will not know what share
Participant X has transferred. Hence, Participant Y will not know the precise balance in her
account (which will be equal to her/his initial balance of 100 points plus three times the number
of points transferred by Participant X) when making her/his decision.
34Both participants have to announce transfer shares that lie between 20% and 80% of the balance
in their accounts. Since Participant X￿ s account has an initial balance of 100 points her/his transfer
share will correspond to a number of points between 20 and 80. These points will leave the account
of Participant X and will be tripled when deposited into Participant Y￿ s account. Participant Y will
therefore receive a number of points between 60 and 240, which will be added to the 100 points in
her account. In sum, Participant Y will have between 160 and 340 points in her account, of which
s/he can transfer a share between 20% and 80%. These points will be transferred from Participant
Y￿ s account and will be deposited into Participant X￿ s account.
Both participants will be prompted by the computer to enter their decisions, expressed as
percentages anywhere between (but including) 20% and 80%. We will refer to the decisions as ￿X￿ s
TRANSFER SHARE￿and ￿Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE￿ .
When Participant X chooses X￿ s TRANSFER SHARE s/he will not know Y￿ s TRANSFER
SHARE. Equally, when Participant Y chooses Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE s/he will not know X￿ s
TRANSFER SHARE.
There is one important detail about the transfer out of Participant Y￿ s account. The computer
adjusts the share that is actually transferred from Participant Y￿ s account to Participant X￿ s
account. More speci￿cally, the computer will adjust Y￿ s transfer share in a random way, increasing
or reducing it by up to 20 percentage points. That is, the computer will generate a number that
we call ￿CHANGE TO Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE￿by picking a random percentage number among
-20%, -19%, ..., 0%, ..., +19%, +20%. Each of the whole-numbered percentages in this range is
equally likely.
The number drawn by the computer cannot be in￿ uenced by the participants.
Therefore, the total share that is sent out of Participant Y￿ s account, and that we call ￿Y￿ s
ADJUSTED TRANSFER SHARE￿ , is equal to:
Y￿ s ADJUSTED TRANSFER SHARE = Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE + CHANGE TO Y￿ s TRANS-
FER SHARE
Y￿ s ADJUSTED TRANSFER SHARE is a percentage number between 0% and 100%. (Please
note that if the CHANGE TO Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE is a negative number, e.g. -20%, then
35its absolute value (in the example, 20%) will be subtracted from Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE even
though it is ￿added￿(+) in the above formula. Adding a negative number is like subtracting its
absolute value.)
Before the interaction starts, the computer will inform Participant X about the randomly drawn
value of the CHANGE TO Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE. S/he will see an announcement on the screen,
stating,
￿The computer￿ s randomly drawn CHANGE TO PARTICIPANT Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE is
XX%.￿
(XX is the randomly chosen number between -20 and 20.)
Therefore, Participant X will know the CHANGE TO Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE drawn by the
computer before making her/his decision. However, participant Y will not her/himself be informed
of the CHANGE TO Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE drawn by the computer, before making her/his
decision.
Importantly, keep in mind that it is Y￿ s ADJUSTED TRANSFER SHARE that determines the
exact transfer from Y to X. When making her/his decision, Participant X will know one of the two
components of this share (the random draw by the computer) but s/he will not know Participant
Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE.)
If you have any questions about the instructions please raise your hand.
(END OF PART I HANDOUT)
Understanding Test:
Before we proceed we ask you to answer the following ￿ve questions. Once you have answered
all of them correctly, you will move on to the decision stage of Part I.
Please note that we make a calculator available to you on the screen. You can access the
calculator by clicking on the Calculator icon. The calculator will remain available throughout the
experiment.
You will receive immediate feedback when you submit your answer to each of the questions. If
your answer is incorrect you will be asked to try again, and as many times as you need. However,
after several failed attempts please raise your hand and we will come to your desk to explain any
36open questions.
1. The initial balance in both participants￿ accounts is 100 points. Suppose that you are
Participant X, and you choose
X￿ s TRANSFER SHARE = Q1X %[subject speci￿c random number].
How many points will be in the account of Participant Y, available for him/her to transfer to
you? _______
Please click OK.
[In case of a mistake an error screen appears, saying "Your answer is not correct. Please try
again. If you need help, raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your desk.￿Likewise for
all other questions.]
2. The initial balance in both participants￿ accounts is 100 points. Suppose that you are
Participant Y, and Participant X chooses
X￿ s TRANSFER SHARE = Q2X%[subject speci￿c random number].
How many points will be in your account, available to transfer to him/her? _______
Please click OK.
3. The initial balance in both participants￿ accounts is 100 points. Suppose that you are
Participant X, and you choose
X￿ s TRANSFER SHARE = Q3X%[subject speci￿c random number].
How many points will be in the account of Participant Y, available for him/her to transfer to
you? _______
Please click OK.
4. The initial balance in both participants￿ accounts is 100 points. Suppose that you are
Participant X and you choose
X￿ s TRANSFER SHARE = Q4X%[subject speci￿c random number].
Suppose further that the other participant (Y) chooses
Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE = Q4Y%[subject speci￿c random number],
and that the computer￿ s random adjustment is
CHANGE TO Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE= T4%[subject speci￿c random number].
37How many points will you have in your account after both transfers? ____
Please click OK.
5. The initial balance in both participants￿ accounts is 100 points. Suppose that you are
Participant X and you choose
X￿ s TRANSFER SHARE = Q4X%[Q4 subject speci￿c random number].
Suppose further that the other participant (Y) chooses
Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE = Q4Y%[Q4 subject speci￿c random number],
and that the computer￿ s random adjustment is
CHANGE TO Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE= T5%[subject speci￿c random number].
How many points will you have in your account after both transfers? ____
Please click OK.
You have completed the understanding test successfully. Please note that none of the numbers
that were given in the above questions are meant to be suggestive of what anyone may want to
decide in this experiment. They only serve as an illustration, for the sake of the understanding
test.
Please click OK.
This is the DECISION STAGE - Part I.
You are PARTICIPANT X.
The computer￿ s randomly drawn CHANGE TO Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE is
CHANGE TO Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE = DX% [subject speci￿c random number]
Please enter your transfer share (a percentage between 20% and 80%):
X￿ s TRANSFER SHARE = ______%
If for some reason you want to change your decision, simply re-enter a new number. You have to
con￿rm your decision (by clicking the OK button) to make it ￿nal. Once you con￿rm your decision
you will not be able to change it.
[Screen for the Trustee, with instrument:]
This is the DECISION STAGE - Part I.
You are PARTICIPANT Y.
38Please enter your transfer share (a percentage between 20% and 80%):
Y￿ s TRANSFER SHARE = ______%
If for some reason you want to change your decision, simply re-enter a new number. You have to
con￿rm your decision (by clicking the OK button) to make it ￿nal. Once you con￿rm your decision
you will not be able to change it.
397 Appendix C: Detailed data summary
In this appendix we discuss subjects￿compliance with Nash equilibrium and simple dominance in
each of the games, as well as their best response rates and other data patterns. The CTG game
under the no instrument condition has a unique Nash equilibrium, where both the trustor and
the trustee transfer the minimum allowed, 20% of the pie. Compliance with equilibrium is 32.6%
(30.3%) for the trustor and 50.5% (51.6%) for the trustee in the no instrument condition, CTG-NI
(in the instrument condition, CTG-I) in the pooled data. Therefore, we can say that compliance
with equilibrium is higher for the trustee (for whom the Nash equilibrium strategy is also dominant)
than for the trustor. When the CTG game is played under the instrument condition and the shift z
weakly exceeds 0:14, it is a dominant strategy for the trustor to transfer a share of her endowment
as large as she is allowed, 0:8, since the amount that she transfers is multiplied by three, and she is
guaranteed to receive at least 0:34 of this total amount, thus a larger amount than she intially sent.
In the 22 instances with shifts greater than or equal to 0:14, the trustor transfes 0:8 only 7 times,
making compliance around one third. Although the play data reveals a very high level of violations
of dominance, it is well known that the trust game invokes non-pecuniary preferences, which makes
it hard to draw conclusions about subjects￿rationality by looking at the play data. Nevertheless, it
is still informative to evaluate compliance with dominance in strategic situations that invoke non-
pecuniary preferences in order to assess the strength of dominance arguments. Although under the
no instrument condition all the beliefs that can be stated (in the interval [0:2;0:8]) are rational, the
introduction of the shift z in CTG/I limits the range of beliefs which are rational to the interval
[0:2 + z;0:8 + z]. Given that trustor subjects can state any belief in the interval [0;1], we can
count how many beliefs fall outside the "admissible" interval. We ￿nd that trustor subjects stated
"inadmissible" beliefs in only 5 out of 122 cases, a low frequency that is line with the frequencies
with which dominated actions are played in games that do not invoke augmented preferences (see
for example, Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) and Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2008)). In this,
rationality is not thrown out of the window in trust games, even if the subjects￿choices are often
most easily explained by non-pecuniary preferences.
The MTG has a unique (weak) Nash equilibrium, (top;right). Looking at the pooled data we
40￿nd that Column subjects play right 68.9% and 73.7% of the time and that Row subjects play
top 73.8% and 49.5.% of the time in the no instrument (MTG-NI) and in the instrument (MTG-I)
conditions, respectively. Although none of the players has a dominated action in the MTG game
when the game is played without the instrument, the addition of the instrument makes top a
dominated action for Row whenever the number of robots playing left is larger than or equal to 9.
In this case, playing bottom yields an expected payo⁄ larger than 120, which makes top dominated.
Row players choose top 8 out of the 27 times in these cases. This high frequency of violations of
dominance is cause for concern, but it may well be driven by non-pecuniary preferences. As in the
CTG game, violations of rationality in the MTG are better assessed by analyzing subjects￿stated
beliefs. In the instrument condition, the presence of robots imposes constraints on the interval of
beliefs that Row can hold about the actual play of Column. When the number of robots playing left
is x, the probability with which Left is played has to lie in the interval [0:5(x=10);0:5+0:5(x=10)].
We observe that our subjects state beliefs outside this interval in 23 out of 95 cases, thus violating
dominance considerably more often than it is usually observed. This is the main reason why we
focus on the CTG data in the analysis.
We now consider some other features of subjects￿stated beliefs, namely their level of accu-
racy in predicting the play of opponents. In the CTG/I and CTG/NI, respectively, the average
expected actual transfer shares stated by the trustor are 35.02% and 33.02%, which di⁄er from
their corresponding average actual transfer shares, 30.54% and 30.29%, by less than ￿ve percentage
points. Thus, we can say that the population of the trustor subjects predict the behavior of the
population of trustee subjects with considerable accuracy. In the MTG, a similar level of accuracy
is observed: in both instrument conditions, the average stated belief of actual play of left by the
Column subjects di⁄ers from actual play by approximately ￿ve percentage points, 35.93% versus
31.15% in MTG/NI and 44.91% versus 39.60% in MTG/I (after adding the e⁄ect of the robots).
We now examine the consistency between trustor subjects￿stated beliefs and their choices of
transfer shares by determining best-response rates. In the CTG best-response rates are rather low,
with transfer shares being best responses to stated beliefs in 41 out of 95 cases in the no instrument
condition, and even lower in the instrument condition, with only 39 out of 122 cases. Best-response
41rates are substantially higher in the MTG, with trustors playing best reponses in 61 ouf ot 95
instances in the instrument condition, and 76 out of 122 in the no instrument one.
An interesting feature of the trustors￿stated beliefs in the CTG is that the re-payment percent-
age that she expects is a multiple of 5%. When the game is played without the instrument this is
the case 90.5% (86/95) of the time. When the instrument is present the frequency of such beliefs
drops to 38.5% (47/122). However, that drop can be explained by the fact that the shift is not a
multiple of 5 percentage points, but a percentage value between -20% and 20%. If we subtract z
from the belief statements (thereby generating a hypothetical belief about the opponent￿ s intended
re-payment), the frequency increases to 78.7% (96/122). This feature of the data is reassuring be-
cause in another strategic setting Costa-Gomes and Weizs￿cker (2008) have oberved that subjects
very often state beliefs as multiples of 5%. The CTG/I data show that subjects are able to make
more precise probability statements, depending on the infomration that is given to them.
In MTG, we observe like in Costa-Gomes and Weizs￿cker (2008) that the relative frequency
of the stated beliefs that are multiples of 5% is quite high, at 92.6% (113/122) when there is no
instrument and 91.6% when the instrument is used.
42